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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINE

CURRENT PATTERNS



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December 1955

This paper, describing the development of the international Communist Line in 1955, is being issued after the 20th Congress of the CPSU (14-25 February 1956). A preliminary examination of the Congress proceedings indicates that they have formalized and amplified somewhat the strategy and tactics which had been observed earlier in a developmental stage. The 20th CPSU Congress seems to have performed a task analogous to that of the 7th Comintern Congress of 1935 which endorsed and amplified the "popular front" line which had been implemented by the CP France during a period of several months prior to that Congress.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINE: CURRENT PATTERNS

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PREFACE

This is the first in a series of papers which will describe and analyze the developing tactical pattern of the International Communist Movement.

The emphasis in this series will be upon the tactics of the Communist Movement outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc i.e., upon the tactics of the Communist Parties and fronts within the Free World. However, the tactics of all components of the International Movement represent an organic whole. To maintain proper perspective, therefore, it will always be necessary to set forth as background an analysis of the tactics of the directing force of the Movement, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), its immediate arms -- Soviet diplomacy and Soviet clandestine services -- and its auxiliaries and allies within the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

No single issue will attempt to cover the whole range of the strategy and tactics of the international movement in detail, but will concentrate upon those aspects which have the greatest significance for the period covered. Over the course of several issues, however, it is hoped that a balanced perspective on the whole movement will be achieved.

The format of future issues is expected to correspond to the one employed in the first issue, i.e., division into two main sections, one on the strategy and tactics of State agencies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc; the other, on the strategy and tactics of the Communist Movement outside the bloc (Communist Parties and international fronts). The latter, for convenience, has been dubbed "Free World Communism."

These two main sections will be tied together in an introductory section which will analyze and describe the over-all strategy of the World Communist Movement.

In future issues it is hoped that the strategy and tactics of the movement may be analyzed against the background of Communist capabilities -- a task which the first issue has set aside.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Scope of the First Issue.

This issue focuses on the strategy of the CPSU as it has been so dramatically revealed in the foreign policy of the Khrushchev-Bulganin leadership which took office in February 1955. The new Soviet foreign policy is analyzed in terms of its expansionist objectives and its ideological basis.

This analysis is followed by a section on the implications of the new Soviet foreign policy and ideological line for Free World Communism.

It has not been considered necessary in this first issue to include the whole question of Chinese Communist policy and its possible relationship with the rest of the international movement. This is not to deny the impact of Chinese Communist interests and strategic concepts on Soviet policies. It is a fact, however, that with the possible exception of Bandung, it has been Soviet foreign policy and the CPSU's ideological line which have held the limelight during the year and which have had the greatest observable impact on Free World Communism, rather than the policies of Communist China. Future issues in this series will continue to focus on developments which become significant, and it is likely that this will result in extensive treatment of CPR policies and actions.

The period covered in this issue is January - September 1955. A few later developments have been included, but primarily as additional illustrations of the conclusions reached on the basis of the main period. These additions should not be interpreted as representing a systematic analysis of the period after September.

From the evidence, it would appear that the new Communist strategy was designed for a relatively long term. It has involved a broad shift in the tactics and world-view of the whole International Movement. Such shifts are not undertaken lightly by the Soviet leaders. It has taken the USSR several years to crystallize

the new strategy. The whole International Movement has not yet fully adjusted to it. It is a matter of historical record that Soviet policies have sometimes required relatively long periods of internal assimilation and local adaptation. The most recent example of this is the Latin American Communist Parties which -- under CPSU guidance -- took about five years (early 1949 - late 1953) to bring the strategy and tactics of the "National Liberation" program to the present stage of development for Latin America. It is important to keep in mind this phenomenon of lag in the development of International Communist strategy and tactics: the "push button" view is to be avoided.

Summary

Under Khrushchev and Bulganin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has embarked upon a period of further expansion at the expense of the Free World states and social forces which had resisted Communist aggression in the years since 1948. The new phase of Communist expansion is represented in the slogan "peaceful competition," which symbolizes a new strategy of international communism.

The main factor entering into the basic reassessment of the world balance of power, from which the strategy of "peaceful competition" grew, was probably the recognition of strategic stalemate (nuclear warfare capabilities, passage of the Paris Agreements and the economic-technological problems and potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc as weighed against those of the Western Bloc).

Obliged to devise a new formula for world conquest in the face of these factors, the Soviet leaders exhibited a keen sense of realism and tactical astuteness which contrasts with the dogmatic subjectivism of the Stalin era.

The new formula is a radical revision of the 1947 Cominform Declaration, with its rigid view of the world as divided between two monolithic "camps." This world view effectively inhibited any potential for Communist competition for what were only weakly polarized countries and social groupings in the non-Communist "camp." The new strategy is based upon the principle that such "reserves" of the United States can be depolarized and gradually, brought within the influence of the USSR. The new formula for Communist expansion calls for maximum practical exploitation of all kinds of internal conflicts of interest and ideology within the non-Communist world. This exploitation is carried out by all agencies of the CPSU, but mainly by Soviet foreign policy and by the Communist Parties and international Communist fronts operating within the Free World ("Free World Communism" for convenience).

Soviet foreign policy carries on the program of exploitation and competition in the action spheres of diplomacy, foreign trade, and cultural-scientific interchange.

The main objectives of the new Soviet foreign policy are to destroy the ability of the United States to rally united non-Communist resistance to Sino-Soviet expansion; to facilitate the build up of Communist Bloc power; to facilitate the expansion of CPSU assets within non-Communist countries; and to make Communist ideology attractive once again to left-wing and "liberal" elements in the Free World.

The new Soviet foreign policy is explicitly opportunist and highly flexible in its tactics. Khrushchev and Bulganin have established a climate of general negotiability by a number of specific acts (Austrian Treaty, mission to Belgrade, Porkkala, "Summit," etc.) which, while not infringing at all on the real strategic interests of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, have enabled them to pose as sincerely desirous of reducing international tensions by peaceful negotiations. They have attempted to make serious inroads on the unity and international resources of the leading Western powers by their tactics in the Near and Middle East.

Soviet foreign policy toward India and Burma has changed since mid-1954 -- dramatically so since the new leadership took over in February 1955. In the Far East, the USSR took the initiative in restoring relations with Japan: immediately, as part of the drive to establish the climate of negotiability; and in the long-run, as a first step in detaching Japan from the United States. In the Near East, Soviet foreign policy has sought to generate and exploit regional conflicts of interest and to shift some of the countries from their Western orientation.

The new strategy creates a number of serious tactical problems for Free World Communism. Such problems are immediate for the Communist Parties in countries which are the targets of the neutralization drive of Soviet foreign policy. But, in addition, the tactics of the CPSU toward non-Stalinist Marxists have serious ideological implications for the whole Communist movement.

To minimize the confusions and weakening effects which the new international line might have upon the Communist movement, and to reorient Free World Communism, the CPSU has emphatically affirmed the Marxist-Leninist foundations of the new line; and has proclaimed that the relaxation of tensions between states does not mean an end to the "class struggle", either on the international or the national scene.

This emphasis on basic principles of Marxism-Leninism was observed late in 1954 in the USSR, and has continued throughout 1955.

The role of Free World Communism in the new phase of the global class struggle is to support Soviet foreign policy and exploit the opportunities for expansion which the foreign policy is aimed at developing within the Free World.

The tactics of Free World Communism are also explicitly based upon the intensified emphasis of Marxist-Leninist principles of the "class struggle." This emphasis has been observed since December 1954, when the CPSU-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) launched an intensified campaign against "capitalist super-exploitation." The Cominform Journal throughout the year continued to play upon anti-capitalism themes. Free World Communist Parties specified that the relaxation of tensions between states does not mean the liquidation of the local class struggle.

Not only does this re-emphasis of Marxism-Leninism by Free World Communism mean a reaffirmation of the obligation to support the USSR, but it also amounts to a sharpening of the local Communist attack, and greater tactical flexibility in identifying and utilizing local allies. Free World Communist Parties are concentrating more on local issues and less on broad international issues.

There is evidence, for example, that the CPSU has instructed the Latin American Communist Parties to focus their attack on

"class" symbols of "U. S. Imperialism" (i.e., on "Wall Street, " Standard Oil, United Fruit, etc.) and on local "class-enemy" agencies of "U. S. Imperialism," rather than on the United States as a state. A similar shift to local issues has been observed in West European countries. Communist tactics in industrialized countries are focused on local anti-capitalist issues, in the exploitation of which the CPs hope to increase their access to and influence over non-Communist (i.e., Socialist and Catholic) workers.

Soviet foreign policy enhances the prospects for a freer development of conflicts of interest within the capitalist class in the industrialized countries, and the CPs expect to exploit these conflicts, as well as the anti-capitalism issue, but the main emphasis is upon the latter.

Signs of such a shift of emphasis in Western Europe have been noted in a number of countries, but the most striking example is France. Because the CP France has long been a testing agency of the CPSU for tactics in Europe, it is believed that the other West European CPs are, or soon will be, reoriented in the direction marked by CP France.

The CP France has been engaged since early 1955 in a major campaign against capitalism. Its object is to concentrate the Party's activities on working class struggle for immediate demands, and its ideological focus, on the ultimate revolutionary character of the current line. Throughout the year, the CP vigorously sought to win over non-Communist workers on the basis of "unity" actions and appeals. The 1934 build-up for the "Popular Front" of 1935 was repeatedly played upon in Communist propaganda. The CP evidently hopes that this action campaign for "unity from below," coupled with the insidious effects of the new Soviet foreign policy, will sufficiently shake the anti-Soviet determination of the leadership of the Socialist Party to force a basic realignment of parties in France and will lead to the weakening or destruction of French ties with the United States and its other partners.

In Italy, the CP has mainly sought to exploit the relaxation of tension to force a relaxation of anti-Communism within the Christian-Democratic Party and of governmental restrictions upon its freedom of action. The CP has not been so outspokenly anti-capitalist as has the CP France (although there have been some signs of intensification of class struggle propaganda), but whether this is a result of special circumstances in Italy, of lag in taking up the CPSU line, or of as yet unresolved differences within the leadership, is not known.

In the non-industrialized countries, the CPs continue to base their tactics on the strategy of "national liberation". Among other things, this strategy includes an appeal to a section of the local capitalist class on the basis of self-interest and nationalist sentiment. Consequently, it is not to be expected that the CPs in the "colonial and semi-colonial" countries would concentrate their propaganda on direct anti-capitalist themes. However, as has been noted, the CPSU has made the Latin American CPs shift away from their agitation against the United States as a state, in favor of attack upon "class manifestations" of "US imperialism" and of greater focus on local matters. A similar development has been noted in India.

The CP India, moreover, has had to face the very serious problem of adjusting its line toward the Nehru Government. The CPSU's cultivation of Nehru's foreign policy has obliged the CP India to reverse its position on this issue. This shift was achieved with less difficulty, however, than the adjustment of the Party line toward Nehru's domestic policy -- in particular, to his economic program, key elements of which have a direct bearing upon the problem of India's "independence," and hence, upon the relations between India and the Communist Bloc.

These problems continued to engage the CP India throughout the year, and will not be formally resolved until the next Party Congress.

The CP Japan began formally to adjust its tactics to the requirements of Soviet foreign policy and to other elements of

the over-all Communist strategy early in the year. It has progressively come above ground to concentrate on "legal" forms of struggle (overt political action; infiltration and subversion). It has ostentatiously renounced its former policy of premature and sectarian violence and seeks to re-establish itself as a legitimate Japanese institution. Its immediate objective is to rebuild its mass influence and organizational strength. It has its eye set mainly on competing with the Japanese Socialist Party and upon generating support for a new foreign policy. It hopes to exploit conflicts of interest within the capitalist class.

In the Middle East, the Communist Parties are generally too weak to do more than give propaganda support to the Soviet foreign policy of exacerbating local and international tensions. In Greece and Syria, however, the CPs have made significant gains in extending their influence among non-Communists, demonstrating notable skill in united front tactics.

CP Greece has sought to establish a broad front of left-center parties for the 1956 elections, making effective use of its front parties to establish relations with the centrists. A number of center parties have come out for ending the repression of the CP. The CP has exploited the popularity of the Cyprus "enosis" (unification) question. Soviet diplomatic representatives have cultivated non-Communist political leaders. Finally, possibly as part of the CP's effort to legitimize itself in public opinion, its radio transmitter in Bulgaria has ceased broadcasting. The CP's skill in manipulating political power by means of front groups and unity tactics has been striking.

CP Syria has established a working alliance with the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party on the common ground of anti-Westernism and opposition to the Baghdad pact states. International Communism, in cooperation with CP Syria, has scored significant successes in generating support for Soviet foreign policy among non-Communist parliamentarians and in weakening the power of the leading anti-Communist party in Syria. The Secretary General of the CP won election to parliament and occupies

a key position on the foreign affairs committee as well as on several other committees. Communist influence has grown in the trade union field.

In the "colonial and semi-colonial" countries, the problem of the use of armed action is a continuing one, since it is part of the standing formula for successful "national liberation."

During the period under review, there seems to have been no major, across-the-board, decision on the use of armed struggle in its relation to the new Soviet foreign policy. The CPSU has encouraged the development of armed struggle capabilities in Latin America. The CP Burma may be thinking of giving up its insurrection. CP Malaya has sought to end its uprising, but strictly on its own (unacceptable) terms. CP Philippines, while wishing to be able to concentrate on "legal" forms of action for several years, has indicated that it expects to keep up some armed action in the face of the regime's unwillingness to capitulate to Communist demands.

The international Communist fronts have also adjusted their tactics to give maximum support to and extract maximum advantage from the new Soviet foreign policy. By concentrating on specific issues and adopting a pose of reasonableness, they seek to break-down anti-Soviet, anti-Communist unity and to reap increments of strength at the expense of the anti-Communist groupings.

In line with their desire to broaden their influence, all of the major international fronts except the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) have invited their former Yugoslav affiliates to rejoin them. The fronts have called for the end of the "cold war" between themselves and their anti-Communist counterparts. The international youth and students' fronts (WFDY, IUS) have devised programs aimed at appealing to specific vocational and regional interests. The last "Peace" Congress at Helsinki was markedly broader in its representation than were earlier affairs.

The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) has continued to call for a basic anti-capitalism orientation by its affiliates ("superexploitation") and has intensified its efforts to weaken anti-Communism within the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and International Federation of Christian

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Trade Unions (IFCTU).

Organizational implementation of the new international line has been expressed in the development of increasing flexibility in "unity" actions, in manipulation of Communist front organizations, and in terms of strengthening the CPs internally.

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PART ONE: THE NEW PHASE OF SOVIET EXPANSION

I. The Strategy of "Peaceful Competition".

A. The Dynamics of the New Soviet Strategy.

1. "Peaceful Competition" or "competitive coexistence" is the slogan for a new strategy designed to facilitate the expansion of Sino-Soviet strength outside the Communist bloc. The dynamic essence of the slogan contrasts with the former somewhat negative slogan of "peaceful coexistence" before the idea of aggressive competition was added to it. With this addition, the nature of "peaceful coexistence" was changed. It became the slogan for a whole series of concrete acts¹ by which the Soviet leaders have sought to establish a climate of "negotiability" as a means of breaking down the barriers erected against Communist expansion during the Cold War. The establishment of this climate is prerequisite to the launching of a full-scale, effective competition with the United States for the sympathies of neutral and potentially neutral forces within the Free World, with special reference to the "colonial and dependent" countries.

2. The new strategy of international Communism is not defensive, in the sense of being a retreat because of serious Communist internal weakness, as some observers at first concluded. It is a program for dynamic advance of Communist political, economic and subversive power by new techniques; a program which substitutes tactical astuteness for rigid dogmatism; which makes tactical withdrawals for strategic advantages.

I Removing the obstacles to the settlement of the Austrian problem, pushing for "normalization" of relations with Japan, West Germany, and Yugoslavia; putting forward more reasonable appearing proposals for arms reduction; turning back Porkkala to Finland; agreeing to the "Summit" Conference; adopting better manners in diplomacy and a more discriminating external propaganda.

B. The Soviet Reassessment: New Factors in the Balance of Power, New Soviet Approach.

3. The new strategy is the result of a basic reassessment of the world balance of power. Neither all the factors which entered into this reassessment, nor the relative weight which was given to each, are known. Certainly, the ratification of the Paris Agreements was a most important immediate factor. Others probably included considerations of the universal danger of nuclear warfare, and the economic potentialities of the Communist bloc over a period of continued, and more intensive, build-up. It is possible that there was pressure within the Communist world for a revision of the methods by which coordination of the economies and of political controls is achieved. There have also been some signs of a revision of Communist estimates on the stability and potentialities of world capitalism.

4. For these reasons, and possibly others that are not fully apparent at this time, the Soviet leaders approached their basic problems with a sense of realism which was in contrast to the dogmatic subjectivism of the Stalin period. Basically, it would seem that the Khrushchev leadership finally decided to revise the "two camps" formula of the 1947 Cominform meeting; at least, to overcome the rigid application of the formula which was nullifying the effectiveness of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. The main defect of the 1947 formula was that it had attributed a unity and anti-Communist hostility to the non-Communist world which the latter did not really have, at least until Communist military aggression and vituperation stimulated it.

5. There were signs of a basic reassessment and of a trend toward new methods earlier, (e.g., Soviet efforts to cut into Western trade relations; strategic and tactical formulations at the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952; the adoption of better manners in diplomacy in 1953) but the decisive shift has taken place with the change in leadership in the USSR.

6. The new formula represents a systematic effort to exploit, in practical terms, and by all available means, the "contradictions" which Soviet propagandists had long been pointing to in the Free World, but upon which Sino-Soviet policy had not been effectively operating.

C. Two Arms of CPSU Action: Foreign Policy and Free World Communism.

7. The two main action arms of the CPSU -- Soviet foreign policy and the Communist Movement outside the Communist bloc -- are being geared to support and to exploit the new strategy. This process of adjustment on the part of Free World Communism was not fully completed during the period under review.

II. Soviet Foreign Policy.

A. Spheres of Action.

8. The strategy of "peaceful competition" operates in a number of spheres of Soviet foreign policy: the diplomatic, where the USSR competes with the United States for influence over uncommitted governments within the Free World and to break down the ties between the United States and its allies; the economic, where Soviet actions support the diplomatic action, and where the USSR has launched a drive for trade with underdeveloped areas which, together with selected technical assistance programs, it is using as a means of bringing these areas into greater dependence on Communist economic resources and trade; and the "cultural", scientific, etc., in which the Soviets not only gain access to Free World technological assets, but are also able to contact and influence important political and social groupings within Free World countries. The "exchanges" being pushed by the USSR so strongly during the period under review, and the easing of travel restrictions, are intended to open up the Free World to further Soviet expansion.²

B. Basic Soviet Objectives.

9. The main objectives of the new Soviet foreign policy are these:

- a) To roll back Western strength; to diminish the power of the United States to rally Free World unity, and, in practical terms, to destroy the alliance and bases system of the United States by detaching countries from the United States (focus on Asia and Middle East), and by manipulating and sharpening tensions between Free World countries.

2 The Soviet leadership appears to have concluded that the risk inherent in this program--exposure of the people of the Sino-Soviet bloc to bourgeois influences--either is minimal, or is outweighed by the advantages.

- b) To facilitate the build up of Communist Bloc power for what the Soviets consider will be an eventual and inevitable show-down with the United States.
- c) To facilitate the expansion of Communist overt and covert assets within the Free World (i.e., the national and international Communist fronts, Communist Parties, Soviet/Satellite espionage assets and other Communist clandestine capabilities).
- d) To refurbish Communism as an attractive goal: on a world scale, to give the Communist system a mass appeal that is competitive with the Free World system of "bourgeois democracy".

C. Tactics.

10. The new Soviet foreign policy is based upon an increased sense of flexibility and realism in tactics.

"In the Central Committee our Party has a leading organ of a genuinely collective nature which is leading the Party and the country along the correct path and which combines firmness in internal and external affairs with great flexibility and courage in defining decisions of the most complicated tasks with Lenin-like wisdom."

(Moscow, TASS, 7 August 1955.
Underlining supplied).

"The Party solves... / its/ tasks, guided by the Marxist theory of revolutionary dialectics and by Lenin's admonition to avoid stereotypy and dogmatism, to be flexible in tactics, and always to take into account concrete conditions and study the true picture of living reality."

(Kommunist No. 14, September 1955.
Underlining supplied).

11. While maintaining the essential strategic positions (e.g., on Germany; disarmament) of the Communist Bloc, Soviet foreign policy has demonstrated its tactical flexibility in pursuing its objectives of neutralizing the underdeveloped countries (focus on Asia, Africa, Middle East) by practical competition with the West and of encouraging the growth of conflicts of interest within the Free World. The Soviet leaders have also substantially maintained the climate of negotiability (Khrushchev's anti-Western vituperation in India and Burma notwithstanding) which is essential to the success of their foreign policy.

12. Competition for the Asian Countries: Burma and India.

Sino-Soviet policy has long been aimed at enlisting and increasing the international support of the non-Communist Asian Countries. The main focus, centering upon Burma and India and later, Afghanistan, became increasingly evident during late 1954 (after the publication of the Chou-Nehru Declaration of the "Five Principles" in June). In his foreign policy speech of 9 February 1955, Molotov set the stage for an intensification of the effort to pull India and Burma still further away from the West by declaring that, despite the fact that these countries were basically capitalist, they were pursuing a "peace" policy abroad--i.e., a policy favorable to the Communist Bloc.

13. Japan.

In line with its effort to demonstrate Soviet reasonableness and in what was probably intended as a first step in the direction of detaching Japan from U. S. influence, Molotov initiated informal negotiations for the "normalization" of relations with Japan in December 1954-January 1955. That the Soviet leaders were aware of the need for substantial preparation before such a result could be seriously contemplated, has been evident from the slow pace of the negotiations and the Soviet refusal to make any important concessions. From their point of view, it has been

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sufficient to hold up the bait before the Japanese in order to promote internal frictions within Japan -- frictions which the Japanese Communist Party will foster and exploit, and which the Communists hope will eventually lead to the installation of a pro-Soviet regime.

14. Exploitation of Free World International Conflicts of Interest.

In Africa and the Middle East, Soviet foreign policy is primarily directed toward generating and encouraging conflicts of interest among the countries on the scene, between them and the leading Western powers, and among the latter. Soviet foreign policy towards the Asian, Middle Eastern and African countries is a part of the Marxist-Leninist international "class struggle": the anti-Communist bloc is to be weakened by cutting off its major markets and international sources of support and by aggravating conflicts of interest among the Western powers. As a French Communist has recently pointed out³ in rationalizing the Communist position in North Africa, Stalin had characterized such "struggles" as that of the Emir of Afghanistan and that of the "merchants and bourgeois intellectuals" of Egypt for independence as "'objectively revolutionary'" because such a struggle "'weakens, disintegrates and undermines imperialism'".⁴ The Communist position on such questions, according to Stalin, is that they must be viewed "'not... in isolation, but on... a world scale.'"⁵ This is a theme which has received notable attention in recent Soviet statements, especially in the form of the slogan of "proletarian internationalism."

15. Maintenance of the Climate of Negotiability: Treatment of the U.S.

A key element in the Soviet effort to maintain the climate of negotiability has been a reduction in Soviet propaganda attacks upon

³ Cahiers du Communisme, September 1955.

⁴ Citing Stalin, The National Question.

⁵ Stalin citing Lenin, Collected Works, XIX, 287.

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the United States (and the other Western powers) as states. This shift was marked, not only by restraint in the policy statements of Soviet leaders and in the daily propaganda (radio and press) of the USSR, but also, by what appears to have been a policy directive to some CPs abroad to shift the focus of their attack (see Part Two, II, B) away from the United States as a state toward local issues and more "class"--centered aspects of U. S. "imperialism."

16. Since the Foreign Ministers Conference, the Soviet leaders (especially Khrushchev) and the CPSU press have become increasingly crude in their attacks upon the leading Western nations. At the same time, they have continued to express themselves in favor of relaxation of tension. In effect, the Soviet leaders have taken credit for bringing about the "Geneva spirit"⁶ and are trying to discredit the West by saddling it with the partial break-down of the international detente.

D. Problems for Free World Communism.

17. The new Soviet strategy and tactics have posed a number of problems for the Communist movement outside the Orbit.

- a) Control. Despite the lack of any evidence that the CPSU has relaxed its control over Free World Communism, some elements of CPSU policy and propaganda contain a potential for the growth of local organizational autonomy.
- b) Free World Communism is obligated to rationalize Soviet actions which are in apparent conflict with the Soviet claim to be the sincere champion of international detente.
- c) Communist Parties in countries which are objects of the Soviet neutralization drive (notably, in India) are faced with very difficult strategic and tactical problems.

6 With such notable exceptions as the Kaganovich October Revolution address in which the Western powers were granted grudging credit for having helped in the achievement.

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d) Free World Communism has had to make certain adjustments to accommodate the new Soviet policy toward Democratic Socialism and other non-"Stalinist" movements.

18. The CPSU has been obliged to furnish a firm ideological footing for its new strategy. An ideological line has been devised to meet these problems and to reorient the tactics of the international Communist movement in the period of international relaxation of tensions.

III. The Marxist-Leninist Foundations of the New International Strategy.

19. Underlying the new foreign policy and all other elements of the new Soviet/Communist strategy remains the "international class struggle", which gives a solid ideological footing to the "realism and flexibility" in tactics. This became quite apparent in the aftermath of the Belgrade visit, when the CPSU let it be known that the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia implied no surrender of its basic principles.

This was done by doctrinal explanations issued by leading French and Italian Communists in rebuttal to the "hasty" and "superficial" criticisms made publicly by the head of the pro-Cominform CP of Trieste, Vittorio Vidali. This choice of non-Orbit Communist Parties as the medium for the corrective explanation is, perhaps, another instance of the CPSU's effort to minimize its controlling role.

20. In the USSR, the stress on "class struggle" was first observed within a broader re-emphasis of the whole body of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and of a "creative" (i.e., non-dogmatic, and, by implication, non-Stalinist) approach to Marxism-Leninism. This broad campaign may be seen in its initial stages in mid-1954, i.e., by the publication in Kommunist of an editorial reasserting the correctness of the 1946-48 "Zhdanovist" resolutions on "purity" in the cultural, scientific and ideological fields. An even earlier indication may be seen in Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" (1952), which undertook to bolster the claim of Marxism-Leninism to be a "science" concerned with discerning "objective" social-economic "laws." The new Soviet "Political Economy, a Textbook," published in 1954, continued this effort. The emphasis was clearly discernible in discussions of Soviet literature at the Second Writers' Congress in December 1954; in the discussion of the priority of heavy industry (December 1954-March 1955); in the question of the consequences of nuclear war for the future of Communism as compared to that of capitalism (February-May 1955);

and in CPSU statements directly bearing upon doctrine, strategy and tactics (especially in issues of Kommunist, January - May 1955).⁷

21. The main elements of Marxist-Leninist doctrine stressed in these discussions were the need to maintain "purity" of principles, and constant "vigilance" against contamination by "bourgeois ideology"; while exercising "flexibility" in tactics, and while correctly utilizing "everything really valuable in European and American science"; the dominant role of the CPSU within the USSR and by extension, the dominant role of the Communist Party in the "class struggle" in every country; the irreducibility of the international "class struggle."

22. The CPSU has continued the emphasis upon Marxist-Leninist doctrine which was observable earlier in the year, e.g., --

Issue No. 14 of Kommunist (signed for publication, 30 September) -- the issue in which Molotov's letter of self-criticism appeared -- contained an editorial which is especially rich in doctrinal discussion. It stresses the need for the creative and realistic application of Marxist-Leninist methods to the solution of complex problems; avoidance of "stereotypy and dogmatism" and the need for "flexibility" in tactics, while at the same time insisting upon maintenance of "the unshakable principles of Marxism-Leninism." It reaffirms Leninist doctrine on the "further rotting of capitalism," while warning that "it would be a

7 The immediate, practical implications of these discussions for Soviet domestic policy, as well as whatever other, more long-range implications they may have for the strategy and tactics of International Communism, have been excluded from treatment in this paper. Our purpose in citing them is to show that they included a definable class struggle content, which has manifested itself in directives delivered to Free World Communism. In other words, we believe that it is desirable to show that the class struggle line appears throughout the whole range of CPSU ideological discussion.

mistake to think that the tendency to rot excludes the rapid growth of capitalism."⁸ The implication here is that the Communists must give a strong push to hasten the collapse of capitalism, and also, perhaps, that the Soviets have revised somewhat their real estimate of the staying-power of capitalism. The editorial specifies that the "struggle of the workers in capitalist countries and the prospects of this struggle can be explained correctly only by adopting the view stemming from life itself and analyzing concrete facts from the Marxist position."

The October Revolution Anniversary Speech by L. M. Kaganovich is, like the editorial in Kommunist, extraordinarily rich in doctrinal implications. Among many other things, Kaganovich emphasized the sharpening of "class contradictions" within capitalist countries. He denied that there is now, as there was after World War I, any prospect for the "relative stabilization" of capitalism. He said that revolutions arise from the "internal contradictions" of capitalism and cannot be exported by the USSR, and he predicted "the triumph of socialism and Communism" within the 20th century.

23. To summarize: firmly anchored in the international class struggle doctrine, Soviet foreign policy operates to sharpen the Communist attack upon the Free World by refining the definition of targets and adjusting the attack to concrete conditions, and to depolarize key sectors of the Free World in order to gain access to new assets which, at a later time, can be reconstituted around the Communist pole. The same line of action is being adopted by Free World Communism, as will be seen from Part Two of this paper.

⁸ A Soviet economist, A. Kats, who was sharply attacked in March for holding that capitalism would collapse "automatically," is again attacked by this editorial in the same terms -- a fact which suggests persistence of error within Soviet theoretical circles.

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PART TWO: THE ROLE AND TACTICS OF FREE WORLD
COMMUNISM IN THE INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY

I. Coordination.

24. The CPSU expects its other external arm -- Free World Communism -- to play a key role in the global "class struggle", alongside the arm of Soviet foreign policy.

25. The tactics of Free World Communism are closely integrated with the new Soviet foreign policy. Free World Communism supports Soviet foreign policy on the one hand, and on the other, exploits the new opportunities for expansion which the foreign policy provides.

While Soviet diplomacy moves to fragment Free World unity, to outflank the United States by indirect attacks on its allies and "reserves," the International Movement tries to generate pressure upon Free World governments and important sectors of the Free World elite to accede to the Soviet foreign policy aims. Moreover, by redirecting their tactics within Free World countries, the Communist Parties and fronts undermine anti-Soviet governments and political groupings and exploit the new opportunities for expansion of political and organizational influence which the new Soviet tactics open up for them, particularly in the field of the united front tactic. Free World Communism thereby gives active support to the Soviet foreign policy drive while building up its strength for eventual seizures of power.

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II. The Marxist-Leninist Foundations of the Policies of Free World Communism.

26. The international class struggle is the common bond tying the Soviet foreign policy and the tactics of Free World Communism together in a single, integrated program of action.

A. The Directive to the Free World Communist Movement.

27. The CPSU has directed Free World Communism to base its policies on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, with special emphasis on the principle of the "class struggle."

28. Evidence for this directive includes the following:

- a) In December 1954 the WFTU launched an intensified (i. e., not a new) campaign against "capitalist super-exploitation" -- a drive against raising worker productivity in capitalist countries, and a direct attack upon the very bases of the capitalist economic system. In January 1955 the Cominform Journal published the "Theses" of the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute (MELSI) on the 1905 Russian Revolution, in which working-class leadership (in "alliance" with the peasantry) -- in contrast to "bourgeois democratic" leadership was stressed and in which armed action was heavily endorsed as a means of carrying out revolution.
- b) On 22 April 1955, the Cominform Journal published an editorial commemorating Lenin's birthday in which unusually strong emphasis was given to the fight against capitalism.
- c) Other issues of the Cominform Journal have reiterated the importance of the "class struggle"; of solid Marxist-Leninist education for Communists, of the "vanguard" role of the CP, and other elements in the overall campaign to reinforce the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

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29. Of special interest is the Cominform Journal editorial of 14 October entitled "Struggle of Working People in Capitalist Countries for Their Vital Demands."

This editorial -- significantly -- does not mention the role of the United States in the other capitalist countries, the alleged "enslavement" of which was the key slogan of Communist propaganda during the Cold War. Instead of gearing their tactics to the issue of "American imperialism" the editorial tells the Communist Parties of all capitalist countries (including the U.S.) to build "working class unity" in struggle for such "concrete demands" as "higher wages, the cessation of mass dismissals, increased unemployment benefits, improved working conditions, abolition of the speed up, and the end of discriminatory rates of payment for women and young workers!"

This editorial, a direct attack upon the capitalist system ("impoverishment of the working class"), stresses "unity in action," with special reference to strike action.

30. The Communist Parties outside the Orbit have specified that the relaxation of international tensions does not signify a relaxation of the "class struggle", either in terms of anti-capitalism or of the Communist "national liberation" drive:

Canada: "Peaceful coexistence does not take away from the right of peoples to change their governments by their majority, democratic action, but presupposes that right." The idea that "peaceful coexistence" must include the maintenance of the status quo is "imperialist propaganda."

(Leslie Morris, National Affairs Monthly, February 1955).

France: "The action of Communists in capitalist countries, for the defense and emancipation of the working class, the support which they give to the movement of liberation of colonial peoples, has no connection with the problems posed by peaceful coexistence, that is to say, with establishment of peaceful relations between states, whatever their regime."

(Pierre Courtade, L'Humanité, 30 September 1955. Italics in original).

Belgium: Jean Terfve in Communisme No. 2, 1955, expresses views practically identical with those above -- "peaceful coexistence" does not mean maintenance of the "status quo" in the colonies or in the capitalist countries.

Cuba: "... The achievement of peace agreements cannot mean that the oppressed peoples, the peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial world, would renounce the struggle for their independence and accept -- on the sacrificial altars of co-existence between the socialist world and the capitalist world -- the yoke of oppression. Neither is it possible to expect that the working class of Italy or France, for example, postpone or set aside their legitimate yearnings to establish socialism in their respective countries.

It is one thing for the great states with antagonistic regimes to co-exist; and it is another, very distinct thing that the peoples would silence their protests and stop seeking their emancipation.

... Now when a period has begun in which Washington, London, and Paris are disposed to co-exist with Moscow without threats or atomic fears, we Communists shall continue with our struggle. We shall demand better wages and living conditions for the working class, land for the peasant, industries for the nation. We shall persist in raising the glorious banner of socialism. The gentlemen who yesterday, before all that, were wont to speak of 'agents of Moscow,' will walk with their tail between their legs. And those who take the position that we should give up the workingman's wages and national sovereignty as a 'token of guarantee' of co-existence shall have to shut up in the long run, because it is no longer possible to go on confusing things which are not identical."

(--RESPUESTAS del Partido Socialista Popular, published by the Press Dept. of the National Committee of the P.S.P. (CP Cuba). Havana, 22 August 1955).

Italy: General Secretary Togliatti scorns those "who seriously think it possible to assert that consolidation of the detente means that the Communist and Socialist movement has to retreat, that it has to allow itself to be swept aside, and that it has even to abandon some of its positions," as well as "those who declare that there will no longer be any necessity to talk of revolutions, that there should no longer be any revolutionary movements -- and all this will be the result, presumably, of the relaxation of international tension." The CP Italy, he says continues to "stand for the profound socialist transformation of our society" and to rely "on the strength and unity of the working masses."

(Cominform Journal, 7 October 1955).

B. Tactical Significance.

31. The stress on "class struggle" not only reaffirms the obligation of Free World Communism to support the new Soviet foreign policy, but even more significantly, means for the Free World Communist Parties and international fronts a more realistic targeting of their attack and a potentially more effective approach to usable allies.

32. Shift to local issues.

The emphasis on "class struggle" implies a shift by Free World Communist Parties to a more intensive exploitation of purely local issues and a decline in the former concentration on broad international issues.

33. This shift has been most noticeable in a decline in local Communist attacks upon the United States as a state and an increase in concentration of attack upon "class" aspects of United States policy.

34. There is evidence that the CPSU has directed Free World Communism to make this shift.

- a) The Cominform Journal, in publishing articles on Latin America has, since the Summit meeting, noticeably soft-pedalled the issue of alleged "US imperialism" in Latin America. What is more significant is the fact that, in publishing accounts of policy statements and other materials issued by Latin American Communist Parties, the Journal has, since Geneva, deleted strong attacks against the United States Government which appeared in the original CP texts. The propaganda of these CPs, as it appeared in the Journal, concentrated its "fire" on local "class" enemies and, where America was brought in at all, tended to concentrate on specific "class" manifestations of US "imperialism" (e.g., Standard Oil, "Wall Street Monopolists," United Fruit, etc.) rather than on the United States as a state.
- b) This development cannot be viewed as something less than a directive by the Cominform. A highly reliable source has reported that a top official of the Communist Party in one Latin American country had recently explicitly instructed leading Communists in a mass organization to discontinue using the broad term "imperialism" and instead, to use the term, "monopoly." In addition, he said that certain "anti-Yankee" terms should be modified in a Party-drafted statement which was proposed for publication by the mass organization in the local press, where it would be read mainly by non-Communists. There was a clear indication in his instructions that he had received international authorization (i.e., CPSU - inspired authorization).
- c) Leaders of a West European CP recently have told their Party to concentrate on local "class" issues, primarily to break down Socialist and other non-Communist worker resistance to the Communist drive for "working class unity in action." The circumstances of this instruction strongly indicate CPSU direction.

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- d) In addition to these indications that the CPSU has directly intervened to make Free World Communist Parties concentrate on local (primarily upon "class struggle," anti-capitalist) issues, a number of Communist Parties have shifted in this direction. In these cases, to be discussed below, there is no evidence of direct CPSU "guidance"; but it is fair to assume that they represent reactions to what the CPs have understood to be a general Soviet line of reorientation.

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III. Communist Tactics in Advanced Countries.

A. Anti-Capitalism in Advanced Countries.

35. In industrialized countries, the Communists are focusing their attack against the capitalist system and against the employers as the "class enemy". They are concentrating primarily on extending their influence over non-Communist workers (especially Socialist and Catholic workers) by means of maximum exploitation of common immediate and concrete economic and social issues.

36. This does not mean that the Communist Parties of capitalist countries have given up trying to fragment and neutralize the capitalist class. On the contrary, this effort continues. But the new Soviet foreign policy broadens the opportunities for exploitation of the "contradictions" within the capitalist "class" --

- a) by means of practical trade lures;
- b) by the "relaxation of tension," which encourages a conflict of political and economic interests between various sectors of the capitalist "class";
- c) by means of a more flexible tactic towards the "colonial and dependent" countries, which promotes the development of conflicting interests and sympathies within the capitalist "class" in the home country.

37. By shifting from the direct to the indirect attack upon the United States, the new Soviet policy seeks to encourage the emergence of frictions within the national capitalist "class", seeks to undermine the capitalist system as a whole, and gives the local Communists more effective levers to aggravate these frictions. By concentrating primarily on local "class" issues (and other purely national issues), the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries seek not only to extend their mass influence, but also to aggravate the "contradictions" between sectors of the capitalist "class" and between this "class" and the working class.

38. To summarize, the stress on "class struggle" in capitalist countries involves not only the employment of specifically proletarian "class-against-class" tactics, but also, more flexible exploitation of frictions within the capitalist "class" and more practical utilization of allies -- including, where possible, "vacillating" allies within the capitalist "class" itself. The basic struggle against the "class enemy" remains fixed, but the CPSU has given the Communist Parties in capitalist countries a better chance to gear their action to concrete local conditions -- in a sense, to "nationalize" themselves. This element of the current international line has been specifically promulgated by Soviet leaders in emphasizing "non-interference in the internal affairs of other states" and the line that social revolutions are purely national matters -- that the CPSU does not and cannot, "export" revolution. That this is a lie is irrelevant. In terms of tactics, the CPSU does appear to have begun a serious campaign to establish the "independence" of the external Communist Parties in the sense of encouraging them to act upon the objective realities of local conditions. This concept is "Leninist" in origin, but it had been in eclipse for so long under the Stalin system that it is thought of today as a "Mao-ist" idea (a view which is known to be entertained by certain Communist leaders abroad).

B. Class-against-class Tactics (France)

39. The Communist Party of France (PCF), for many years a testing agency for the CPSU, has made a major shift toward concentration on class-against-class tactics in what is regarded as a pilot move for the reorientation of Communist policies in the advanced countries.

40. Basically, the CP France has made a major tactical shift toward concentrated exploitation of local issues. Primarily, it seeks to exploit working class social and economic issues, not only to weaken French capitalism, but also to gain access to and increase its influence over non-Communist

workers. The Party evidently hopes to repeat its performance of 1934-35 and achieve, through pressure from below and the openings furnished from above by the new Soviet foreign policy, a broad "popular front" built upon a "united front" of workers and peasants. Such a movement would seek to force the government to adopt a pro-Soviet foreign policy and would eventually be in a position to take over state power.

41. Secretary General Maurice Thorez launched the PCF campaign against French capitalism at a Central Committee meeting in January, when he attacked the "relative and absolute impoverishment" of the working class under capitalism. This doctrinal principle has continued to be asserted on all possible occasions in the CP press.

42. In May, Francois Billoux, who is considered by most observers to be a "hard-liner" within the Party leadership, reported to a Central Committee meeting that there was some confusion within the Party over the identity of the "main enemy." It is "capitalism, the employers, the bourgeois state," he declared.⁹ A "study conference" was held on the subject of "capitalist super-exploitation" in May. This conference was staged by Economie et Politique, whose editor, Eugene Dumoulin, said that it was incorrect to speak of "productivité à l'américaine," as formerly, and that the correct term should be "capitalist productivity."¹⁰ This underlines the Communist shift in emphasis away from the United States as a state and toward the basic class enemy.

43. In June, the French Communist labor confederation, CGT, scrapped its "constructive" Economic Program, adopted in 1953.

9 L'Humanité, 12 May 1955. Underlining supplied.

10 Economie et Politique, June 1955

The reason given for this action was that the program had tended to dilute the "class struggle" -- to "disorient our comrades in the face of attacks of the adversary."¹¹ A more strongly anti-capitalist program was adopted in its place.

44. In autumn of this year the PCF has approached the question of French North Africa largely on the basis of local and "class" terms of reference. According to French Communist reasoning, the North African problem is the inevitable consequence of the crisis of French capitalism. A handful of French capitalists and colonists in North Africa (the "ultra-colonialists") has imposed its will on the Government. The French capitalists have had to exploit the colonies to the limit in order to make up for losses to the United States in the world market and to compensate for the high cost of militarization. They have encouraged foreign capitalist investment in North Africa as a means of protecting their own investment against the rising tide of nationalism.

45. It has been observed¹² that in publishing an important policy statement issued by Party Organization Secretary Marcel Servin on 31 August, the Party's mass circulation paper, L'Humanité, deleted almost all of his anti-American remarks. On the other hand, in the periodical France Nouvelle, whose audience is much smaller and consists almost entirely of Communist cadres, these anti-American statements were published. The discrepancy in treatment shows that --

- a) the CP deliberately concentrates on local issues so far as the Party rank-and-file and the mass audience is concerned, calculating that the anti-American line had little mass appeal, especially during a period when the Communists were trying to amplify the illusion of "relaxation" generated by the Summit meeting;

11 L'Humanité, 13 June 1955.

12 France Nouvelle, 3 September, and L'Humanité, 31 August 1955.

b) the CP reaffirms to its cadres that the United States remains the main enemy of world Communism despite the shift in the methods and tactical directions of the Communist attack.

In its mass propaganda the CP continued during September to soft-pedal (not to abandon completely) the anti-American issue. This was especially noticeable at the L'Humanité festival at Vincennes on 4 September.

46. While noting the CP's unusual focus on principles of "class struggle," some observers have tended to interpret it in purely local terms primarily as the Party's attempt to counteract the progressive economic and social program of Mendes-France.

This view appears to be too narrow, and it is significant that Thorez has recently set forth a much broader and more basic reason for the concentration. In a speech at the opening of the Central Party School, 10 October, he reviewed the basic nature of the CP as the "vanguard" in the "class struggle":

"In its persistent efforts to disseminate the theory of scientific Socialism in the working-class movement, our Party, since the beginning of this year, has once more had to firmly draw the attention of its members and the whole proletariat to certain fundamental laws of capitalist economy. It especially recalled the law according to which the relative and absolute impoverishment of the working class is the inevitable result of capitalist accumulation, of the concentration of capital, of the formation of big trusts which seize all the wealth of the country."

(Cominform Journal, 21 October 1955.
Underlining supplied).

Continuing, Thorez cited strike action as a major expression of class struggle.

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"In engaging in vast strike actions against the employers, the working class is precisely at this very moment showing that it is conscious of the need to fight against the lowering of its standard of living, for less meagre wages and less inhuman conditions of work."

(Ibid. Underlining supplied).

He defined the correct relationship between action based on economic demands and the need to raise this to a higher level of political consciousness -- the need to overthrow the "bourgeoisie."

"At one and the same time Marxists combat the view of those who see only the political struggle and deny the importance of the economic fight of the proletariat, and the opinion of those who overestimate the role of economic struggle and disregard the significance of the political struggle, the struggle for the final objective of the working class, for Socialism. The economic fight of the proletariat is highly important, but it cannot abolish the laws of capitalism and free the workers from exploitation and privation. It is aimed at the effects of capitalism and not at the fundamental cause of the proletariat's poverty, that is the capitalist mode of production."

(Cominform Journal, 21 October 1955.
Underlining supplied).

In describing the "allies" the Party would need, Thorez paid particular attention to the "working peasants." An intensified effort to get peasant support has been noted in the Party's press, and especially concerned a Central Committee meeting in October, at which Thorez said that the "theory of the pauperization of the working class" also applied to the agricultural workers.

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The Communist position on the "struggles of the colonial peoples against imperialism," Thorez said, with primary reference to French North Africa, was gaining support among "broader social strata of the population," which represent allies.

47. By refocusing its tactical concentration of effort, the CP France is trying to reduce anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism within the Socialist Party and non-Communist trade unions. United Front appeals for joint action on "minimum program" were issued to the Socialists in the cantonal elections last spring and on numerous occasions since then.

In November, the CP further broadened its appeal for unity in the January 1956 elections to include "republicans" as well as Socialists. In a speech to the Central Committee, Thorez

"recalled that there is every condition in many provinces... to unite Communists and Socialists, and that the Communist Party is ready to propose without hesitation a fighting alliance to all other republicans in order to obtain a majority in a number of constituencies."¹³

He said,

" 'Socialists and Communists have agreed to include in their electoral program the minimum program of the national committee of struggle, vigilance, and defense of the lay school, which probably will be approved by other parties.' "

Despite "differences" which have existed between the Communists and their prospective allies, Thorez said that agreement could be reached on immediate objectives and reiterated the Party's

¹³ Moscow, TASS, 4 November 1955

"readiness to support any step forward, any measure favorable to the working class and the people, any initiative serving the cause of peace, freedom, and national independence."

C. Exploitation of the International Detente (Italy)

48. A number of Communist Parties¹⁴ have specifically stated that they expect the climate of international detente to lead to local detente -- i.e., they hope that removal of fear of the Soviet aggressive threat will reduce local anti-Communism; will give them increased freedom of action by leading to a relaxation of governmental pressures upon the Party; and will open up new roads of access to non-Communists.

49. For example, an article in the Italian Communist newspaper L'Unità, of 18 August, said that certain "cold war advocates" are --

"now trying to draw a distinction between the internal and international situation. To them an international move to ease tensions is acceptable, but what is not acceptable is the thought of considering new relations at home with the Communists and their allies."

50. The CP Italy has also indicated that it expects the international relaxation of tension to give it access to non-Communists. The primary problem of the CP Italy is how to break down Christian Democratic opposition to Communism. In this

14 Including the CP Netherlands (cf. De Waarheid, 3, 20 August 1955). Even prior to the "Summit" Conference, according to a report from a usually reliable source, the General Secretary of the CP Mexico was telling his party that a relaxation of tension would mean an end to severe anti-Communism and would give the CPs general freedom of action.

connection, Deputy Chairman Luigi Longo made a statement in L'Unità on 18 August which showed how the Communists wished to translate the international detente into a local detente with Catholic workers:

"When we refer to a possible dialogue with the Catholics, we don't ask anyone to renounce their belief in the world beyond -- if they have any -- or their preference for this or that philosophic, political or social system; we only ask those who say that they condemn the present social injustices and misery, to cooperate with us, to unite their efforts to ours, in order that all difficulties be overcome."

In other words, the Italian Communists seek a broad tactical alliance on the basis of working class interests, without regard to the basic ideological conflict between Marxist materialism and Christian idealism.

51. The political ambitions of the PCI in this period are symbolized in the demand for an "Opening to the Left," which was invented by the PCI ally, the Nenni Socialist Party (PSI). The objective of the slogan is to break down Christian Democratic opposition to Socialism. It has appealed to a number of Christian Democratic leaders who believe that the "Opening to the Left" -- or "Operation Nenni" -- would not only enable them to form a stable coalition government but would also lead to a rupture between Nenni and the PCI. The picture is further complicated by a division of opinion within Nenni's own party over the question of participation with the Christian Democrats versus the alliance with the Communists. Rumors have persisted in Italy that Nenni would eventually break with the PCI -- rumors which have met with consistent denials by Nenni. Most recently, he has said that "unity between the PCI and PSI is the permanent precondition for the conquest of democracy," and has reaffirmed that his party is "first of all faithful to the doctrine of revolutionary Marxism, to the practice of the class struggle, and to principles of proletarian internationalism."

52. Luigi Longo elaborated on the tactics of the "Opening to the Left" in his 18 August statement:

"With our demand for an opening to the Left, we don't ask for the installation of a political monopoly. We only ask for the opening of a wider political and social cooperation among all popular forces. In present conditions, the opening to the Left does not necessarily mean opening towards the Nenni / Socialists or the Communists, or towards both, in the sense of their cooperation with the Government. It means much less. It simply means a policy that will bring an end to all government and management discriminations, a policy which will support the social relations among the people of the world..."

IV. Communist Tactics in Non-industrialized Countries.

A. The Basic Strategy

53. The formula for Communist strategy in the "colonial and semi-colonial" countries is based upon Leninist-Stalinist principles as put into practise by the Chinese Communists. As it was promulgated, with the approval of the CPSU in 1949, the formula had four main points:¹⁵

- a) Formation of a broad, nation-wide united front of the working class and all other classes, parties and groups, organizations and individuals who are ready to wage a resolute struggle against imperialism and its lackeys.
- b) This nation-wide united front must be led by the working class under the leadership of the CP.
- c) The CP must be strong, strictly disciplined and closely linked with the masses.
- d) It is necessary to set up wherever and whenever possible, a people's liberation army, led by the CP. Armed struggle is the main form of struggle in the national liberation struggle in many colonies and semi-colonies.

54. One of the most important features of the Communist "national liberation" strategy is that it envisages the enlistment of a section of the local capitalist class in support of the nation-wide united front, specifically, the "national bourgeoisie," which is held to be opposed to the main enemy, foreign imperialism.

15 Paraphrase of Liu Shao-chi Speech to the Conference of Trade Unions of Asia and Oceania, Cominform Journal, 30 December 1949.

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55. In general, this strategy continues in effect for the Communist Parties of the non-industrialized countries, but the new international strategy confronts it with three main problems: (1) how to apply the line on "class struggle" in the light of the importance of a section of the local capitalist class to the liberation struggle; (2) how to gear local tactics to the Soviet neutralization drive in some countries; (3) what to do about "armed struggle" in the light of the Soviet "peaceful coexistence" line.

B. The Problem of the "Class Struggle" and the "National Bourgeoisie."

56. At the outset, it would appear that the Communist Party in a "colonial" country could not interpret the international emphasis on the "class struggle" in the same way as the Communist Party of an advanced country -- i.e., as a directive for a shift to direct anti-capitalism. To do so would nullify the Party's effort to enlist the "national bourgeoisie" in the liberation movement. As a leading Indian Communist has recently specified, the attack on Indian capitalism cannot be direct:

"...The basic tasks outlined in the Party Programme remain /despite the shift which the CPSU had dictated for the CP India on the question of the foreign policy of the Nehru Government/. It is imperialism and feudalism that continue to block the country's progress..."

"The success of the struggle against the policies of government therefore depends entirely on the extent to which the democratic elements in general, and the Communist Party in particular, make serious efforts to defend the interests of all those sections of the people who are affected by the anti-people policies of the government -- including sections of the bourgeoisie -- and in drawing sections of the ruling party itself into these struggles. This obviously has to be on the basis of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal and not an anti-capitalist programme."

(E.M.S. Namboodiripad, New Age, September 1955. Underlining supplied).

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57. Nevertheless, in their own estimate, the new international strategy opens up for the Communists of such countries as India new opportunities for fighting the local capitalists. According to the Indian Communists, the conflicts of interest within the ruling "class alliance" will prevent the effective expansion of the economy and will generate --

"innumerable conflicts at every stage -- conflicts with imperialism, with feudalism, with other sections of the bourgeoisie and, above all, with the mass of the Indian people."

(--Ibid).

C. Gearing Tactics to the Soviet Neutralization Drive.

58. The main focus of the Soviet neutralization effort in Asia has been upon India, Burma, and Afghanistan. A longer-range effort has also been launched to neutralize Japan. The adjustment of the Communist Parties in India and Japan has been substantial.

59. Reorientation of CP India.

The Communist Party of India was obliged to make a special adjustment to the newly intensified Soviet cultivation of Nehru for his foreign policy, which the Soviets have evidently concluded is "objectively revolutionary."

The CPI observed the Soviet shift in January and February 1955, and subjected its line on the Nehru Government to close scrutiny. The discussion, which appears to have been somewhat unsettling, concluded with a new formulation of Party policy in June.

Briefly, the CPI decided (a) to give general support to Nehru's "neutralist" foreign policy, while (b) maintaining pressure to keep that policy oriented in favor of the Communist Bloc; (c) to support such domestic policy proposals of the Government as increased India's independence of Great Britain and the United States. The Party made it clear that it would continue to

work for the eventual overthrow of Indian capitalism and for the establishment of a "People's Democracy." It saw, in the Soviet diplomacy, not only a means of directly advancing the cause of world Communism, but also, a lever which, if properly used by the CP itself, could result in the fragmentation and destruction of the ruling bourgeoisie of India.

It is also interesting to note that the CPI, thanks to the abatement of direct Soviet attack upon the United States, found it possible in the June resolution practically to ignore the issue of "U. S. imperialism" -- an issue which had little appeal in India in any case and which had irritated a substantial faction within the Party which preferred to concentrate the attack upon the remaining elements of British influence.

In India, the new Soviet diplomacy and the international line on "class struggle" have not only relieved the Communist Party of much of its former unproductive campaign against the United States (as a state) and permitted it to concentrate on the more visible foreign "enemy" (Great Britain), but have also given the Party more flexibility and precision in its definition of local enemies.

In positive terms, the new line permits the Indian Communist Party to postulate an alternative economic and social policy while relieving it of the necessity to appear the total oppositionist, the dog-in-the-manger, that it has been up to the present. This is illustrated by the Party's "positive" stand on obtaining increased economic and technical assistance from the USSR.

The CPI has a delicate problem facing it: how to select the issues on which it will support the Government, and exactly how far to go in specific detail; and, while exploiting local tensions, how to balance this action against the Soviet desire to maintain and strengthen Nehru's "independence." In practice, this is no easy task, and there is evidence that it has not been solved completely in such matters as the Kanpur strikes, the Goa issue, and the states reorganization controversy.

The CP India has seriously embarrassed the Government in the Goa issue. It gained by being more "nationalist" than the nationalists, but its action also should have somewhat opened Nehru's eyes to the true character of Communist "collaboration" with governmental policy.

60. Adjustment of the CP Japan (JCP)

The JCP appears to have been alerted to the Soviet intentions before they were formally put into motion.¹⁶ In any case, a JCP New Year's Statement¹⁷ indicated that a considerable tactical shift had been decided upon prior to the delivery of Molotov's note to the Japanese Government (25 January).

The new tactical line of the JCP emerged in the form of specific actions. Examples are the progressive emergence of Party leaders from underground existence, "unity" tactics in the February elections, measures designed to create the impression that the Party has disbanded its paramilitary organization, and policy statements (e.g., an analysis of Communist tactics in the elections and decisions of the 6th National Council meeting). This tactical line bases itself squarely on the "class struggle", with the necessary adjustment to the "dependent" condition of Japan. It recognizes that its past policies have been "sectarian" and "adventurist" as a result of overestimating its own strength and under-estimating the strength of the "enemy". It sets for the Party the tasks of making itself popular once more and of building its mass and internal strength from the ground up.

¹⁶ According to some Japanese press sources, the JCP began its readjustment to the new Soviet tactics following the publication of the Soviet-Chinese Declaration of October 1954 (i.e., the declaration issued with the visit of the Khrushchev delegation to Peking).

¹⁷ Akahata, 1 January 1955.

The JCP will seek to exploit every possibility for promoting frictions within the "bourgeois class enemy" and for enlisting popular support. It seeks to re-establish itself as a "lovable" Party, as Nosaka Sanzo was trying to do before the CPSU stopped him in 1950.

In policy terms, the Party hopes to generate sufficient pressure from below for the replacement of pro-Western governments by "neutralists" and progressively, pro-Communist regimes, and eventually, to establish a "People's Democratic" regime.

To do so, it works to create a broad "Democratic United Front for National Liberation" based on a united working-class front and the worker-peasant alliance. The latter will be built by maximum exploitation of basic local economic and social issues and of the issue of "national independence" from the United States (the issue upon which the Party hopes to destroy the unity of the capitalists and to gain the support of the "national bourgeoisie").

D. Support for the Soviet Drive to Promote Conflicts of Interest in the Middle East.

61. The Communist Parties in the Middle East are formally dedicated to the strategy of "national liberation" but most of them with the possible exception of Syria and Greece are far too weak to pursue this strategy in terms of action. Hence, their effort at present is mainly geared to propaganda in support of the Soviet drive to exacerbate regional conflicts of interest. In the two cases cited above the capabilities of the Communist Parties permit more significant action.

62. In Greece, the policy of the CP (KKE) involves multiple programs and has centered upon preparations for the general election to be held in 1956. First, operating through its front party, the EDA, the KKE has during 1955 advocated the formation of a Popular Front in which it seeks to win the participation of one or more of the centrist parties. Representatives to Communist front parties negotiated with major centrist leaders and offered to support the principal planks of the programs of

these parties, calling for military economy, resolutions of the Cyprus issue on the basis of Greek demands for "enosis" (union), and internal fiscal and social reforms. There were persistent reports that EDA might give up its identity in an effort to bring about such a popular front. A number of the centrist parties have campaigned for the lifting of security regulations and the legalization of the KKE. At the same time, the KKE "Free Greece" radio gradually diminished its inflammatory propaganda from abroad. During the last six months before its suspension in December, it concentrated heavily on "supporting" the Greek position on the Cyprus issue, accused the Greek government of seeking a compromise at the expense of the Greek and Cypriot people, and beginning in September 1955, issued diatribes against Turkey. External support on the Cyprus issue was given by Greek Communist elements in the Middle East and Western Europe. These efforts were complemented during the latter part of 1955 by an active campaign by Soviet diplomatic representatives to make contact with and influence Greek centrist political leaders, as well as to support leftists. The economic advantage to Greece of increased trade with the Soviet Bloc has also been publicized by the leftist parties, by press organs in which Communist influence is believed to operate, and by Soviet representatives themselves. Even the clandestine apparatus of the KKE received instructions to support this campaign to create a United Front.

63. In Syria, the efforts of the Communist Party during 1955 followed three main lines. First, operating through the contacts established and maintained by the Secretary General of the Party, it established a working political alliance with the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party leadership based on resistance to the Baghdad Pact powers and on the theme of national independence from Western influence, and cooperated with ASRP officers in the Syrian Armed Forces. It also extended its support to a non-Communist political opportunist in connection with the electoral campaign for the Presidency. Lastly, it succeeded in winning the cooperation of a significant segment of Syrian organized labor. Although the presidential campaign failed to bring the ASRP and its other allies

to power, the CP had earlier succeeded in electing its Secretary General to the Syrian parliament, where he is active on seven committees including the key committee on foreign affairs. Syrian parliamentarians were given special attention, both by local Communists and the international front organizations, and the majority of them signed the Vienna Peace Appeal. A delegation of parliamentarians attended the Helsinki Peace Assembly. Another delegation including the Secretary General of the CP, made an extended tour of Soviet Bloc countries. The CP sought to exploit their trip by organizing large meetings after their return at which their favorable impressions of the countries they visited were widely publicized. Simultaneously, as its second program, the Syrian CP working in the background exploited to the full for both propaganda and political purposes, the assassination of an ASRP figure who had wide influence in the Syrian armed forces. The primary target of this campaign was the best organized anti-Communist party in the country, many of whose followers, both in and out of the Syrian armed forces, were arrested or forced into exile. This campaign was largely based on allegations of U. S. complicity in the assassination and of the U. S. sponsorship and support of the target party. The third program of the Syrian CP was designed to complement Soviet diplomatic maneuvers. It supported and participated in the Syrian delegation to the Bandung Conference, called for increased trade with the Soviet bloc, and during the last quarter, approved the Czech-Egyptian arms transaction, urged that Syria follow this Egyptian example, and further, supported the local campaign against Israel. It is interesting to note that during the entire year the CP Syria has explicitly refused to abandon its organization as a quasi-legal party, has not campaigned for de jure legalization, and has not sought a visible position of power.

64. Other Middle Eastern CPs.

The weaker CPs in the Middle East are keying their propaganda to the exploitation of regional conflicts of interest: Arab-Israeli, Greek-Turkish, etc. For example, CPs in both the Arab countries and in Israel blame the U. S. for the tense Arab-Jewish situation. The Lebanese CP charges that the "clique of

big landlords and capitalists" serving "the imperialists" has sold out Lebanese resources to "American Zionist companies" and the CP also seeks to exploit fear of Turkish aggression under the Turko-Iraqi Pact.¹⁸ The Israeli CP has recently¹⁹ decided to "intensify the struggle against the policy of the Israeli Government which is striving to conclude an anti-Soviet military agreement with the United States, and to follow a policy of peace and national independence." The "Anglo-American Monopoly" is blamed for Arab-Israeli tension, and Egypt's purchase of Czech arms is pictured as simply a reaction against "the pressure of those who want to force her to join the Turkish-Iraqi bloc." There is reason to believe, however, that the arms deal provoked some rank and file resentment within the Israeli CP.

In Egypt, meanwhile, with the advent of closer Egyptian-Orbit relations, the main local Communist organization (United Communist Party) was reported to have adopted recently a new line of attacking individual leaders, but not the Government as a whole.

E. The Problem of "Armed Struggle".

65. Armed action is a key element in the Communist "national liberation" strategy as formulated in 1949, and is the most important "form" of the "class struggle" in the non-industrialized countries." This does not mean that the Communist Party in the "colonial or dependent" country has no other "forms of struggle." Whether it goes into armed uprising or concentrates on other "forms of struggle" at any given time depends upon its own (and the CPSU's) estimate of the revolutionary possibilities. In other words, while armed struggle (in the words of the 1928 Program of the Comintern) is the "supreme form" of revolutionary action,

18 Lebanese CP statement dated June 1955. Underlining supplied.

19 District conferences of the ICP as reported in Warsaw broadcast, 15 October 1955.

its use depends upon a complex of circumstances, as assessed by the Communists.

66. In the period under review, the problem of the use of armed struggle seems to have been judged in terms of local conditions and of Soviet foreign policy objectives for the country concerned. For example, the CP Japan has publicly disavowed its former excesses of violence and has ostensibly disbanded its paramilitary organization. On the other hand, there is evidence that the CPSU is encouraging the use of armed action in Latin America. While they appear to be trying to disengage themselves from armed uprisings, it is by no means clear that the Communist Parties of Southeast Asia have basically changed their lines in the period under review.

67. Encouragement of Armed Action in Latin America.

The Chinese Communist People's Daily praise (20 August) of the guerrilla warfare being carried on in Colombia is one example of the encouragement being given to the development of armed struggle capabilities in Latin America. It fits into a revival of interest in armed action by the CP Brazil. This CP, which, because of its position as the "model" CP for Latin America, always warrants close observation, enthusiastically endorsed the January 1955 publication of the "Theses" on the 1905 Russian Revolution by the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute of the CPSU. The "Theses" stressed the importance of armed action. The Party's enthusiasm was duly recorded in the Cominform Journal (29 April).

The CP Brazil published a statement on its armed struggle policy in March. This policy was publicly reiterated in August. It is cleverly keyed to the question of a possible rightist military coup against the constitutional regime. The Brazilian Communists talk in terms of armed action to uphold the constitution. Indications are that the immediate aim of these declarations is not military, but "psychological": i. e., that they are issued in the hope of generating widespread fear for the safety of democratic liberties and the existing constitutional system. The Communists thus hope

to facilitate the extension of their influence in the creation of the "single democratic front of national liberation." Another objective is to spread the belief that the local Communist Party is a firm and patriotic defender of the constitutional regime and should therefore be given full legal status and freedom of action. Mingled with this aim is the Party's fear that it would be more severely repressed if a right-wing regime came to power.

At the same time, it should be realized that such "patriotic" declarations by a Communist Party can serve as a convenient "legal" cover for the organization of para-military formations, ostensibly created solely for purposes of initiating or participating in armed resistance to an attempted right-wing coup. According to the terms of the CP Brazil's policy, this armed struggle would be directed toward achievement of at least partial, temporary military-political successes. These would represent lasting propaganda gains for the Party and would give it a strong advantage in the drive for the establishment of the alliances necessary for the "single, democratic front of national liberation", which would wage a revolutionary fight for the establishment of a "People's Democratic" regime.

68. The most recent, and by far the strongest expression of CPSU encouragement of armed action in Latin America, is to be found in an article by A. Sivolobov²⁰ in the Soviet publication International Affairs (No. 9), signed for the press on 13 September 1955. In the light of his past record, the author's praise for armed uprisings in the past and for the current Colombian guerilla activity is to be taken as an authoritative directive for the Communist Parties of Latin America. The

20 Sivolobov's writings indicate that he is a CPSU expert on the strategy and tactics of Latin American Communist Parties. In the article cited, he emphasizes strike action, as well as armed action.

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Sivolobov article should be taken as a specific reaffirmation of the 1949 Liu Shao-chi formula for successful "national liberation struggles" to the effect that the Communist Parties in the "colonial and dependent" countries should always consider the possibility of armed action, "wherever and whenever possible;"²¹

It also constitutes a directive to the Latin American Communists to work in the direction of eventual armed action, to be initiated when local conditions, which they help to create, will make armed action feasible. In other words, the Sivolobov article is not a directive for the Latin American Communist Parties to begin armed uprisings immediately.

69. The Armed Struggle in Southeast Asia. The Communists in Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines have been carrying on armed rebellions for many years. There have been indications in the past that they would like to intensify their "legal forms of struggle" and, by implication, reduce their concentration on armed struggle. They have, thus far, not been able to extricate themselves from this concentration. The conditions which they have set for ending armed action have been rejected by the governments in power. Despite fresh Communist efforts during 1955 to "get off the hook," there is no firm evidence that these CPs are willing to do so at any cost to themselves -- even in Burma, where there is an apparent conflict between the policies of the local Communists and Soviet foreign policy.

a) Burma.

On 1 December 1955 the major Communist Party in Burma (Burmese Communist Party, BCP) published the terms on which it would cease the armed uprising that it began in 1948.

21 The qualified character of Liu's endorsement of Communist armed rebellion must always be observed: it is often overlooked by non-Communists (and, in the past, was overlooked by some CPs).

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The terms were (1) that Burma not enter into any pact with the Anglo-American bloc; (2) that all political prisoners be released; and (3) that the BCP and all other "democratic" groups be allowed full civil liberties.²²

It had been expected in Burmese political circles for several months that the BCP would respond to the new Soviet definition of Burma as "independent" and that the Party would attempt to liquidate its armed rebellion in order to concentrate on "legal" struggle, primarily through the legal Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party (BWPP) with the special object of contesting the 1956 elections. Whether this expectation is well-founded was not yet clear in December.

Meanwhile, the smaller Communist Party (Communist Party Burma) issued a manifesto reiterating charges that the Burmese Government was still controlled by the "Anglo-American imperialists" and demanding the formation of a coalition government committed to "anti-imperialist, anti-feudal reforms."

b) Malaya.

In June 1955 the CP Malaya (MCP) requested peace talks. The request was refused.

In September, the Chief Minister of the Federation, Abdul Rahman, agreed to meet with MCP leaders to present the Government's amnesty terms. A meeting took place on 18 November, but when the Communists raided a village, Rahman announced that he would mobilize the whole population against the MCP and the British launched an all-out campaign.

22 Karachi Broadcast, 2 Dec. 1955.

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Meanwhile, the Federation Government has stood firm in its policy that the Communists would be amnestied if they surrendered as individuals, but that there could be no recognition of the MCP itself.

On 23 December the MCP issued a program which has been characterized as "scarcely distinguishable from that of the leading political parties".²³ Nevertheless, the Party demanded political recognition for itself, and this led to the breakdown in the negotiations which were held a few days later.

c) Philippines.

There is evidence that the CP Philippines has long desired to shift away from its fruitless armed struggle to "legal forms of struggle."

A propaganda pamphlet issued on July 1955 said:

"The National Liberation Movement, and the Communist Party leading it, has and will always stand for a peaceful solution to this problem of internal strife. But it is clear that the American imperialists and their manikins are afraid of a peaceful competition for the people's minds.

"The fact...that we stand for peace and peaceful resolution of all issues does not mean that we believe that armed revolution is illegal, immoral or unjustified.

23 Hong Kong, Central News, 27 Dec. 1955.

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"The Liberation Movement knows that whether in the peaceful or in the armed arena, victory for the forces of progress is inevitable. But it also realizes that the armed struggle inevitably causes a lot of suffering.... Because of this realization, it prefers the peaceful way, but is however always ready, willing and able to use the armed means if that is the only means left to secure for our people real freedom, democracy, prosperity and peace."

In September 1955, however, it is reported that a leading Communist military leader was instructing Party members to return to legal forms of action, leaving only a skeleton guerrilla force in the field.

In summary, it would appear that the CP Philippines is standing by its armed struggle policy in principle and that it will continue to do so until it can get a clear opportunity to liquidate the armed struggle on its own terms. Meanwhile, the Party is sending some of its assets into "legal forms of struggle."

d) Indochina.

A definable build up of a line emphasizing "peaceful" means of uniting Communist northern Vietnam (DRV) and the South, and playing down of the threat of military force has been observed in Communist propaganda since the summer of 1955. The "peaceful unification" line was first announced by Chou En-lai in June, but appears to have taken a period of "selling" within the DRV before it was definitely adopted in September.

In Laos, on the other hand, the Communist-controlled Pathet Lao has continued to improve its military capabilities and to resist efforts of the Royal Laotian Government to establish its rule in the northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, according to the terms of the

Geneva Agreements of 1954. Pathet Lao fighting units conducted a significant attack against Royal forces in December, and have been engaged in increasing activity in Khammouane.

At the same time, there have been indications of increasing Communist clandestine subversive activity and capabilities throughout Laos, especially in remote areas and in the southern provinces.

It seems clear that the Pathet Lao has no intention of giving up its base in the North without exacting important concessions from the Government. Whether the plan is to use this base for military aggression in force in the foreseeable future is not known: a more immediate objective may be simply to perpetuate the de facto partition of the country, using the northern provinces as a base for further extension of Communist influence throughout the whole country by "legal" methods.

But whatever the plan may be, it is evident that the existence of a Communist armed force is seriously disruptive for stability in Laos, and that Communist resistance to the Government's assumption of control in the North is being used by the Communists to promote and exploit frictions in Southeast Asia and among the "imperialist" powers involved. Chinese Communist propaganda, for example, has been hinting at direct Chinese intervention to blackmail the Royal Government and to generate regional fears for the consequences of continued "U. S. imperialist maneuvers" in Laos.

The Communist armed struggle policy in Laos indicates that the question of the use of military force has not been decided on a basis uniform to all countries: Liu's original prescription for the creation of a Communist-led armed force "wherever and whenever possible" remains the guiding principle. Special circumstances made it possible to establish the Pathet Lao forces. The apparently

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preponderant influence of Peiping in Indochinese Communism may also have had a bearing on the policy of maintaining Pathet Lao military strength. Just as Peiping seems to have made the decision to concentrate on "peaceful" means of taking over southern Viet Nam, so it seems to be the ultimate center for determining the armed action policy of the Pathet Lao.

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V. Tactics of the International Communist Fronts.

70. The major International Communist Fronts are also attempting to use the opportunities afforded by the "relaxation of tensions" to expand their influence and to break down anti-Communism on the part of organizations and individuals within their particular fields of action. These efforts are notable for their realistic adjustment to specific local conditions, their appeal to the interests of special groups, and their clever exploitation of the "Geneva Spirit" to promote an impression of reasonableness and tolerance.

To a remarkable degree, the strategy of the international fronts is similar to those of the new Soviet diplomacy: multi-pronged approaches and flanking maneuvers to fragment the "opposition," to undercut their positions, and to "depolarize" and detach sectors of the opposition from the influence of anti-Communism.

71. Youth and Women's Fronts.

The International Union of Students (IUS), World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and to a somewhat lesser extent, the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), have launched energetic expansion programs. Self-criticisms for failings of a sectarian nature have been more pointed than ever before within the IUS and WFDY, and both have intensified their efforts to improve their appeal to non-Communists by exploiting specific vocational, avocational, and regional issues. More and more specialized meetings and conferences are being held or are being planned; more specialized propaganda materials are being published; an ambitious program for training leaders in special fields has been decided upon by the WFDY. The IUS and WFDY have been trying to regain their former Yugoslav affiliates.²⁴

24 The Communist International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) has most recently adopted this same policy. (Sofia broadcast, 19 October 1955).

The WFDY has resolved to try to win back former affiliates in Scandinavia, and is planning to adopt the IUS tactics of broadening its appeal to non-Communist organizations by admitting a new category of "associate membership." The WFDY has said that the international detente should lead to an end of the "Cold War" with the non-Communist youth organizations²⁵ and that a joint meeting be held of the different international youth organizations. Organizationally, the WFDY has decided to enlarge its headquarters staff in order to facilitate the expanded activities. The IUS Council meeting in August voted to reestablish its Colonial Bureau to facilitate expansion into colonial areas. A further IUS measure to broaden its influence -- the decision in 1954 to include high school student organizations -- paid off in the Singapore student riots of May 1955.

72. The Communist "Peace" Movement.

The World Peace Council continues to promote Soviet foreign policy positions and to try to extend its influence to elements which had been repelled by the "old style" Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. The Peace Movement has played up the fact that its last (Helsinki) Congress was much more "broadly representative", i.e., attracted many more non-Communists, than earlier Congresses. The Helsinki proceedings were marked by avoidance of direct anti-American virulence, by a definite effort to put forward the peace movement as a "positive" rather than a merely negative force, and by an attempt to create the impression of broad ideological tolerance.

25 Budapest broadcast, 9 November 1955.

It is of interest to note that the local "Peace" organization in one European country has recently been reorganized as part of the effort to blur the pro-Communist character of the movement, and to "broaden" its appeal as a genuinely "patriotic" and positively "peace-loving" organization.

73. The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) has been making a more serious effort than formerly to establish contact with the anti-Communist confederations, ICFTU and IFCTU. Like the WFDY, IUS, and IOJ, the WFTU has rescinded its former position on Yugoslavia. It has a leading role, along with the national CPs, in fomenting social and economic disturbances, and in promoting "working class unity" through the exploitation of "concrete" local "class" demands.

Most recently, WFTU Chairman Di Vittorio published an article in the Cominform Journal, arguing that the international detente had created new possibilities for detente between the WFTU and its anti-Communist counter parts.²⁶ He hinted that the WFTU would even more definitely reorient its tactics to exploit "working class" issues. In the action of the French CGT in scrapping its "constructive" Economic Program of 1953 (an action which seems to have had direct Soviet approval), there is further evidence of such a "class struggle" reorientation. And in the editorial of Kommunist No. 14, there is a still further suggestion of this:

"With the growth of the forces of socialism the ideological struggle of Marxism against reformism is intensified... It is a question of ideological influence on those representatives of the labor movement

26 The Executive Bureau of the WFTU later issued a declaration in the same sense (Pravda, 16 October 1955).

who, being subjectively faithful to the cause of socialism are trying to conciliate Marxism with reformism, since for reason of insufficient Marxist training, they show hesitation of ideas." (Underlining supplied).

This apparently is a barb aimed at Communist labor leaders who have "economist" or "reformist" tendencies, rather than at the "right-wing socialist" labor leaders.

VI. Organization Questions.

74. The new strategy and tactics of Free World Communism require certain changes in methods of organizing the expansionist drive and pose a number of problems of internal organization of the Communist Parties and international fronts.

75. Unity in Action Techniques.

Examples of practical measures adopted by the Communist Movement in recent months to broaden the scope of Communist influence and to break down anti-Communist resistance include the following:

- a) The Leipzig "Conference of European Workers Against German Rearmament." This conference was held under covert WFTU sponsorship in April. It addressed an "Open Letter" to the anti-Communist ICFTU and IFCTU, as well as to the WFTU itself (!) calling for a joint meeting to "consider jointly how to ward off the misery and the disaster which threatens the working masses." At its May meeting, the Executive Committee of the WFTU duly adopted the decisions of the Conference as "its own," and stated that the WFTU would "do everything in its power" to promote the calling of a joint conference of the three international labor organizations.
- b) "Revolving strikes" in France. The PCF and its trade union confederation, the CGT, have been fomenting a series of short (24 hour or less) strikes in single plants. Such "revolving strikes" are aimed at increasing militant activity on the part of all workers without the disadvantages and reprisals inherent in bigger strikes. Such a method enables the Communists to test and to stimulate worker unrest without excessive commitment, thus conforming to the principle spelled out in 1952 and reaffirmed this year that Communist trade union action must take into account uneven levels of militancy from place to place and at different times.

c) CP Austria (KPOe) recasts its political fronts.

On 23 July, the KPOe's political front party, "People's Opposition", decided to release its affiliates in order to broaden the scope of Communist-inspired "unity." The title "opposition" was deemed too negative and out-of-date, now that the party's stand on neutrality is presumably shared by everybody. A liaison committee was set up by the organizations which constituted the Peoples' Opposition in order to broaden the scope of its appeal.

For similar reasons, the KPOe front, Democratic Union, announced on 8 July that it was changing from a society into a political party pledged to "ensure for our fatherland all the benefits of a clearly defined neutrality."

d) Direct, positive appeal to individual non-Communists.

The CP Costa Rica (PVP) has sent a letter of transmittal accompanying copies of its pamphlet "Let us Fight for this Plan against the Crisis" to individual non-Communist Costa Rican leaders. The substance of the letter reads as follows:

"We take the liberty of sending to the entity which you represent the pamphlet "LET US FIGHT FOR THIS PLAN AGAINST THE CRISIS", in which we analyze the economic situation through which the capitalist world is passing, and we propose measures which would be capable of opposing the crisis which has already begun to affect our country.

"We are sure that the reading of this pamphlet will reveal that there exist many coinciding points of view among the different classes existing in the country, determined to save our country from the evils which threaten her and which make practicable our opinion that the formation of a NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT is urgent and possible.

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"We should feel very pleased to receive the points of view of that entity concerning this, as well as suggestions relative to directing the common efforts toward the achievement of the unity of the national forces."

76. Party Building.

Communist Parties are always concerned with strengthening themselves internally, and this has been a major preoccupation for several years. Since the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952, the main theme in the Communist internal organizational effort has been that of activating the entire membership. After Stalin died, the principle of "collective leadership" at all levels of the Party became the principal device for accomplishing this result. Instead of a chain of individual bosses, Communist Parties everywhere began stressing active participation of all responsible functionaries in planning, discussing, and executing Party work. At the cell level, this principle was intended to get all the cell members into active work for the Party -- to generate enthusiasm, to make the rank-and-file commit themselves to the effective carrying out of tasks, and to make them contribute to the Party's knowledge of the realities of local conditions by opening up candid discussions of concrete problems. Other devices connected with "collective leadership" and with the general drive to activate the Party (such as, stimulation of criticism from below; changes in Party structure; new ideas in the communication of instructions from the center; etc.) have been observed throughout the International Movement. While too complex to be discussed in the present paper, these devices have continued to be advocated during the current period.

77. It is still too early to discern in detail new developments in Communist Party organizational practices that can be directly linked with the emergence of new international strategy and tactics. However, a preliminary examination of current CP organizational practices reveals a number of developments which may suggest a general trend.

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a) Recognition of basic weaknesses.

A number of Communist Parties (Colombia, Japan, Pakistan) have sharpened their focus on local realities. They have ceased trying to rationalize internal weaknesses; have subjected their respective conditions to sharply critical analyses; and have concluded that they need to rebuild themselves "from the bottom up", as CP Japan has put it.

b) Salvaging.

Some Communist Parties (notably CP Japan, but also CP Iraq) have decided to rehabilitate disaffected and purged former members. (CP Japan has recently claimed that over 2,000 such members have been salvaged.)

c) Reassignment of "weak" members.

The CPUSA has indicated that some of its inactive members should be reassigned to "mass work." In other words, it estimates that many Communists lack the courage to carry out assignments for the CP openly, but that they can be used profitably and in accordance with their own desires in penetration of non-Communist organizations.

d) Revision of Party Statutes.

The CPs outside the Orbit have been gradually revising their statutes to make them correspond to changes made in the statutes of the CPSU in 1952. The main purpose of such revisions is to write the activation drive into statutory terms (mainly by expanding and redefining the duties of Party members; but also by emphasizing "collective leadership" and changes in meeting procedures, disciplinary measures, etc.)

e) Structural changes to stimulate activation of the entire Party and to improve supervision.

For example, the CP Finland has reduced the size of its city committee in Helsinki and has established a general body (apparently, a kind of "aktiv") of all the heads of base organizations within the city. Moreover, in line with the long-observed effort of Communist Parties in capitalist countries to strengthen their factory cells, the Trade Union Section of the District will now supervise all factory organizations within the District directly. As of last report, these practices are being extended to all other cities in Finland.

f) Tightening up mass CPs.

The Communist Party of Indonesia, having greatly expanded its membership by a massive recruitment drive, in which the emphasis was placed upon development after recruitment, has since been making efforts to tighten up internally. In February 1955 Secretary General Aidit called for intensified efforts to turn the rather amorphous Communist movement into a disciplined CP. Training and close supervision are key elements in this drive.²⁷

g) Membership expansion: putting the CP forward.

In capitalist countries where the CP is very small, it is indicated that intensified -- but selective -- recruitment and holding drives are under way. For example, the Executive of the British CP in March "boldly and frankly

27 Kehidupan Partai, February 1955.

placed the issues of fluctuation in membership as a key problem that must be solved...²⁸ The Party decided that, in addition to "a big sustained recruitment drive," practical steps would have to be taken to keep hold of existing members, chiefly by closer control and supervision. Too many Communists, it was said, think strictly in terms of working inside the Labor Party and the trade unions. This represents a "danger of submergence of our Party in the general labour movement" and must be overcome. Party members must "work in Party organizations" rather than devote their whole time to "mass" work. The Party must make itself "visible" in order to raise the level of "broad united work" from limited immediate issues in order to generate convictions that only a "socialist" revolution can solve the basic problems of the country. The CPUSA has adopted similar views.²⁹

h) Purges and Discipline.

Whenever the international line changes, CPs everywhere face problems of keeping discipline over Party members who, for one reason or another, disagree with the new line. Occasionally, disagreement is so basic that important functionaries must be purged. The present shift contains a potential for significant tensions to develop within a number of CPs, primarily in terms of dissatisfaction among extreme left-wingers and militants who take their doctrine seriously and who may have trouble accepting the CPSU synthesis of a "soft" foreign policy and a "class struggle" ideology. It is too early to tell how strong

28 National Organiser John Gollan, in Cominform Journal, 24 June 1955.

29 Party Voice No. 7 -- 1955.

such tensions may become, and it is entirely possible that the synthesis may be generally acceptable (especially if the CPs push a salvaging drive). Among the major CPs, tensions already exist in India, and may become more critical as the CPI tries to implement its current line in practical terms. There have been few important purges during the current year, but the CP Uruguay ousted its Secretary General Eugenio Gomez Chiribao in July on a variety of charges. The most pertinent of these were that he was dictatorial, that he resisted CPSU direction, and that he sabotaged the Party's effort to apply Mao-ist broad "united front" tactics. It is by no means clear that his ouster had any direct connection with the adoption of the new international strategy.

i) Organizational changes in the International Fronts.

A few of the organizational measures adopted by the major international Communist fronts to extend their influence have already been mentioned (para. 71) -- e.g., the use of "associate membership" in the WFDY and IUS as a means of gaining initial access to non-Communist groups, as well as the expansion of the WFDY headquarters staff. To these it is worth adding a measure taken by the WFTU which may be interpreted as part of an effort to base its work more solidly on local conditions. The WFTU has reduced its central training program and has indicated that it will concentrate on regional or national programs.³⁰ Such a change, while it may have been dictated by other factors, would certainly be in line with the over-all drive of the Communist Movement to localize and specialize its activities.

³⁰ WFTU Circular, 21 October 1955.

VII. Secret Apparats.

78. It appears that the Soviet Intelligence services are taking advantage of the opportunities which the current climate affords for more aggressive recruitment operations, and that they are making increased use of Communist Parties for support (e.g., spotting agents among front groups).

79. A number of CPs which are subject to varying degrees of repression have also indicated that they are making an effort to strengthen the clandestine cadre network which directs and coordinates the "legal" activities of the Party. The Parties in Greece, Pakistan, and Iran have called for an expansion and strengthening of their underground organizations. In an organizational report calling for a radical improvement in the methods and organization of its permanent "clandestine apparatus," the CP Colombia has done the same. This apparatus appears to combine not only the underground cadre network but also an intelligence network and "self-defense" units (i.e., strong-arm squads). Finally, the CP Japan has been reported to have more fully segregated its organization for secret activities from the "legal" Party.

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